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I. Introduction
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that private property may not
“be taken for public use, without just compensation.” [FN1] This clause compels the
government to compensate a property owner for losses caused by government regulation
(often termed “regulatory takings”). [FN2] For example, the clause is triggered when a
government regulation causes a permanent physical invasion of property [FN3] or
eliminates all economically beneficial uses of such property. [FN4]
But what if the government regulates property in a way that merely reduces, rather
than eliminates, the property's economic value? Between 1978 and 1980, the Supreme
Court of the United States twice addressed this “partial regulatory takings” [FN5] issue
and took a different approach in each case. In 1978, the Court wrote in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York that courts must consider (1) the economic
impact of a regulation upon a property owner, (2) the effect of such regulation upon the
property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, and (3) the “character of
the governmental action.” [FN6] But two years later in Agins v. City of Tiburon, the
Court seemingly abandoned this three-pronged approach and ruled that non-confiscatory
zoning creates a taking “if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests.” [FN7]
Until 2005, lower courts often resolved this apparent conflict by balancing the public
interest favoring government regulation against the losses a takings plaintiff incurred
because of the regulation. [FN8] Courts following this “private harm/public interest”
balancing test held that the “character of the government action” element of Penn Central
required an “inquiry into an assessment of the ‘purpose and importance of the public
interest,’ which then must be weighed against the [property owner's] loss.” [FN9] But the
Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. [FN10] called this
“private harm/public interest” balancing test into question. In Lingle, the Supreme Court
overruled Agins and rejected the application of the “substantially advance” test in
regulatory takings cases. The Court held that takings cases may not turn solely on
whether government regulation substantially advances a legitimate state interest because

such a “formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test,
and . . . has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence.” [FN11]
Some commentators claim that by overruling Agins, Lingle also reinterpreted Penn
Central as prohibiting lower courts from considering the public benefits of regulation.
[FN12] For example, a land use hornbook reasons that pre-Lingle precedent required an
“injection of due process considerations into the takings equation” by considering the
appropriate ends of government action. [FN13] By resisting such an “injection,” Lingle
“eliminates evaluation of the legitimacy of the regulation, and a judicial balancing of
interests should follow it to the dustbin of Supreme Court errors.” [FN14] Some
commentators argue that Lingle actually eliminated the “character of the government
action” factor established in Penn Central, [FN15] while others merely contend that the
“character” factor no longer allows lower courts to weigh the public interest favoring
government regulation. [FN16]
This Article disagrees with the assertion that lower courts cannot consider the public
benefits of regulation and argues that, even after Lingle, courts can and should balance
the harm land use regulation imposes on a takings plaintiff against the weight of the
public interest supporting such regulation. This is so for two reasons. First, the Lingle
decision can be harmonized with a “private harm/public interest” balancing test. Lingle
holds that the existence of a valid public purpose standing alone may not justify an
otherwise problematic regulation. This rule is perfectly consistent with the proposition
that courts may balance a public purpose against the harm to a takings plaintiff.
Second, the “private harm/public interest” balancing test is easier to apply than
alternative interpretations of the Penn Central “character” factor. Commentators who
reject the balancing test assert that the “character” factor should be limited to analysis of
whether a regulation resembles a physical invasion of property and/or the extent to which
a takings plaintiff is singled out for regulation. [FN17] This Article suggests that these
interpretations are more difficult to apply than the “private harm/public interest”
balancing test. [FN18] To be sure, the Penn Central test gives judges little guidance
regardless of how it is interpreted and should perhaps be overruled. [FN19] But as long as
Penn Central continues to be good law, balancing public interests and private harms is
less incomprehensible and more consistent with Supreme Court precedent than the most
popular alternatives. Accordingly, courts should treat the public interest favoring
regulation as part of the “character” factor.
Part II of this Article outlines the history of the regulatory takings doctrine. Part III
explains why, as a doctrinal matter, Lingle does not bar courts from weighing the public
interest as part of the “character” factor. Part IV explains why, as a policy matter, courts
should consider the public interest. Finally, Part V shows how courts may intelligibly do
so, using a recent case as an example.
II. Background: The History of Regulatory Takings Law
Before Penn Central, the Supreme Court rarely addressed regulatory takings issues,
although its first major regulatory takings decision seemingly balanced the economic
effects of government regulation against the public interest favoring it. [FN20] In Penn
Central, the Court likewise required courts to consider the economic harm caused by
government regulation and the “character” of that regulation, without making it clear

what “character” meant. [FN21] Some lower court decisions (as well as some language in
the Court's own opinions), however, suggest that this factor refers to the weight of the
public interest supporting government regulation, apparently requiring courts to balance
the public interests favoring regulation against a property owner's economic harm and
investment-backed expectations. [FN22] Most recently, the Court decided Lingle, which
created confusion among lower courts and placed the law in flux. [FN23]
A. In the Beginning . . .
Until the early twentieth century, courts generally applied the Takings Clause
exclusively to physical seizures of private property, as opposed to regulations that merely
limited the use of a person's property. [FN24] The first time the Supreme Court applied
the Takings Clause to a regulatory taking was the 1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon. [FN25] In Pennsylvania Coal, a coal company challenged the constitutionality of
a statute that restricted coal mining beneath private residences in order to prevent
subsidence (i.e., a cave-in) of the residence. [FN26] The Court held that “while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.” [FN27]
In applying the “too far” test, the Pennsylvania Coal Court addressed both the degree
of harm to the coal company and the public interest justifying the regulation at issue. As
to the private harm factor, the Court wrote that although property
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power . . .
[o]ne fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution.
When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise
of eminent domain and compensation [is necessary] to sustain the act. [FN28] The Court
added that by making the coal company's right to mine coal “commercially impracticable
. . . [the statute] has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as
appropriating or destroying it.” [FN29] In other words, the anti-subsidence statute went
“too far” because it virtually destroyed the value of the coal company's property interest.
The Court proceeded to hold that the public interest justifying the statute was not
“sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the [coal company's] constitutionally
protected rights.” [FN30] The Court offered two reasons for its conclusion. First, the
government sought to protect a single private house, which “in ordinary private affairs
the public interest does not warrant much [government] interference. A source of damage
to such a house is not a public nuisance. . . . The damage is not common or public.”
[FN31] Second, the statute “is not justified as a protection of personal safety” [FN32]
because the coal company gave homeowners timely notice of its intent to mine under
their homes, allowing the homeowners to avoid physical harm from subsidence. [FN33]
Thus, Pennsylvania Coal suggested that, in determining whether a taking goes “too
far,” courts may consider the extent to which a government regulation harms a property
owner and the extent to which it protects the public interest.
B. Penn Central and Its Successors: The Three-Part Test
The Supreme Court paid little attention to regulatory takings [FN34] until its 1978
decision in Penn Central. [FN35] In that case, a landowner sought to build an office
building above a railroad terminal. [FN36] The city prohibited construction because the

terminal was a historic landmark. [FN37] The landowner then filed a takings action,
asserting that the enforcement of the historic landmark ordinance unconstitutionally
seized the “air rights” above its building. [FN38]
The Court wrote that its regulatory takings decisions
have identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A “taking” may more
readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good. [FN39]
Thus, the Court seemingly required lower courts to consider (1) the economic impact of a
regulation upon a property owner, (2) the regulation's impact upon the property owner's
investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the government action.
As to the first of these factors, the Court found that the city's interference with the
landowner's property rights was not particularly severe; the city did not interfere with the
landowner's current use of its property and did not prevent the landowner from obtaining
a reasonable return on its investment. [FN40] Furthermore, because the courts had
generally upheld regulations relating to air rights above buildings, the Court found that
the ordinance did not disrupt the landowner's investment-backed expectations. [FN41]
The Court further found that the city's regulations were “substantially related to the
promotion of the general welfare.” [FN42]
The Supreme Court applied all three Penn Central factors in the 1987 case of
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis. [FN43] In Keystone, a group of coal
mine operators [FN44] challenged the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act, which required fifty
percent of the coal beneath residences, public buildings, and cemeteries to be kept in
place as a means of providing surface support to those structures. [FN45] The act also
authorized the state government to revoke mining permits whenever coal mining
damaged such structures. [FN46] The basic purpose of the statute was to prevent the
collapse of buildings above coal mines. [FN47]
The Supreme Court upheld the Pennsylvania statute, holding that each of the three
Penn Central factors supported the statute. [FN48] As to the “economic impact” and
“investment-backed expectations” factors, the Court noted that the statute affected less
than two percent of plaintiffs' coal, much of which could not be extracted for reasons
unrelated to the statute. [FN49] Thus, the regulation burdened “only a small fraction of
the property that is subjected to regulation” [FN50] and there was “no showing that
petitioners' reasonable ‘investment-backed expectations' have been materially affected by
the additional duty to retain the small percentage that must be used to support the
structures protected by [the statute].” [FN51] Considering that the minimal economic
impact of the Pennsylvania law affected both the Court's “reasonable investment-backed
expectations” discussion and its “economic harm” discussion, Keystone suggests that
these two Penn Central factors are intertwined: both relate to the degree of economic
harm suffered by a takings plaintiff.
As to the “character” factor, the Keystone Court held that “the character of the
governmental action involved here leans heavily against finding a taking; the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant

threat to the common welfare.” [FN52] In particular, the “character” factor supported the
state's defense because there was no indication that the “statute [was] enacted solely for
the benefit of private parties” [FN53] or that the state was “exercising its police power to
abate activity akin to a public nuisance.” [FN54] The Court's suggestion that a legitimate
state interest supported the statute implies that the “character” factor “requires a weighing
of public and private interests.” [FN55]
Two Supreme Court decisions in 1980 and 1992 appeared to call Penn Central into
question. [FN56] In Agins, a group of landowners challenged a zoning ordinance that
allowed them to build only five homes on a five-acre tract of land. [FN57] The Court
held that the ordinance “substantially advance[d] legitimate governmental goals” [FN58]
such as preventing the conversion of open space to urban use [FN59] and avoiding the
negative results of such urbanization. [FN60] The Court subsequently reformulated Agins
to mean that a zoning ordinance is not a compensable taking as long as it substantially
advances a legitimate government interest. [FN61]
The Court's 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council upheld a
landowner's takings claim challenging environmental legislation that allegedly prevented
the landowner from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his land. [FN62] The
Court held that the legislation constituted a taking because the plaintiff was “called upon
to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good.” [FN63]
The Court added, however, that even confiscatory regulation could avoid classification as
a taking if it arose from background principles of property law, such as nuisance
regulation. [FN64]
At least one lower court decision suggested that Lucas “removed the weighing of
public versus private interests in determining whether a taking has been effected” [FN65]
and that, after Lucas, any regulation of property value was a compensable taking unless
the government “could articulate background principles [of property law] that prohibit
the uses [proposed by the landowner].” [FN66]
But in 2001, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the three-part Penn Central test
in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. [FN67] The Court there held that Lucas applied only where
a regulation eliminated all economically beneficial use of a landowner's property, and
that partial regulatory takings were still subject to the Penn Central three-part test. [FN68]
This three-part test required courts to consider the economic effect of a regulation on
property owners, the regulation's interference with the property owner's investmentbacked expectations, and the character of the government action. [FN69] The Court's
plurality opinion did not explain the meaning of the “character” factor. But Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, which supplied the crucial fifth vote in Palazzolo, [FN70] noted
that another significant factor in takings cases “is the character of the government action.
The purposes served, as well as the effects produced, by a particular regulation inform the
takings analysis . . . . Regulatory takings cases ‘necessarily entai[l] complex factual
assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government actions.”’ [FN71]
By mentioning the purposes and effects of government action, Justice O'Connor's
concurrence suggested that courts should continue to consider the importance of the
purpose animating that action, as well as the relationship between that purpose and the
action's economic effects; in short, whether the government's action effectively furthered
an important purpose.

In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, [FN72]
the majority of the Court seemingly endorsed the Keystone Court and Justice O'Connor's
view of the “character” factor. The Tahoe-Sierra Court held that the three-part Penn
Central test, and not the Lucas test, governed a temporary moratorium on real estate
development. [FN73] In the course of its decision, the Court briefly explained that the
Penn Central test “entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic
effects of government actions.” [FN74] The Tahoe-Sierra Court's reference to “purposes”
implies that the purposes justifying a government action are relevant when assessing that
action's constitutionality under Penn Central. [FN75]
Between 2002 (when Tahoe-Sierra was decided) and 2005 (when Lingle was
decided), lower courts generally agreed that the Penn Central “character” factor required
them to balance the public interest favoring regulation against the impact regulation had
on property owners. [FN76] For example, in Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. United
States, the plaintiffs had leased land from the federal government and sought permits to
drill oil and gas wells on that land. [FN77] The federal Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) denied the permits in 1994 [FN78] because the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) was planning to acquire the lease in order to prevent drilling from affecting a
nearby underground nuclear waste facility. [FN79] After the EPA decided not to acquire
the lease, BLM issued the permits. [FN80] The plaintiffs then sought compensation under
the Takings Clause for the delay between the BLM's denial of the permits and their
subsequent approval. [FN81]
The plaintiffs alleged that the Penn Central “character of the government action”
factor supported their claim unless the government's action “was designed to proscribe a
nuisance.” [FN82] Overruling its own precedent, [FN83] the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit rejected this argument, quoting Justice O'Connor's concurrence and
Tahoe-Sierra. [FN84] The court stated that “[a]s for the ‘character of the Government
action’ factor, the Tahoe-Sierra Court advocated an examination of the ‘purpose and
economic effect’ of the government's actions . . . . We therefore consider the purpose of
the regulation and its desired effects in determining whether a taking has occurred.”
[FN85] Applying this standard, the court rejected the plaintiffs' takings claim, based
partially on “the potential impact on the public [from] . . . drilling near a nuclear waste
site.” [FN86] Thus, Bass Enterprises, like numerous other courts in the mid-2000s,
[FN87] held that partial regulatory takings claims generally required courts to balance a
regulation's harm to the plaintiff (the “economic impact” and “investment-backed
expectations” factors) against the public interest supporting the regulation (the
“character” factor).
C. Lingle and Its Aftermath
In 2005, the Supreme Court readdressed partial regulatory takings. In Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., an oil company challenged a Hawaii law that limited the rent the
company could charge gasoline dealers who leased service stations from oil companies.
[FN88] The trial court held that the rent control statute failed to “substantially advance a
legitimate state interest,” [FN89] and thus constituted an unconstitutional taking based on
the Agins “substantially advance” test. [FN90]
The Supreme Court reversed. [FN91] The Court reiterated its view that, except under
certain narrow circumstances, [FN92] the Penn Central test governs partial regulatory

takings actions. [FN93] The Court proceeded to state that the Agins “substantially
advance” test was more like the test governing substantive due process actions than the
Penn Central test. [FN94] Just as the Agins test requires courts to uphold any regulation
that is “effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose,” [FN95] the Court's
substantive due process precedent requires a court to uphold a regulation unless it is
“clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare.” [FN96] By contrast, Penn Central requires the Court
to consider not only the reasonableness of government action, but also the impact of such
action on a property owner. [FN97]
After pointing out this inconsistency between Agins and Penn Central, the Court
proceeded to overrule Agins. The Court reasoned that a standard that fails to address the
burden government regulation imposes on property rights “is tethered neither to the text
of the Takings Clause nor to the basic justification for allowing regulatory actions to be
challenged under the Clause.” [FN98] Because lower courts' applications of the Agins
test “revealed its imprecisions,” the Court remanded the case for further proceedings
under the Penn Central standard. [FN99]
In addition to reaffirming its commitment to the Penn Central test generally, the Court
apparently reaffirmed its commitment to the “character” factor specifically, stating:
“[T]he ‘character of the government action'--for instance whether it amounts to a physical
invasion or instead merely affects property interests through ‘some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good'--may
be relevant in discerning whether a taking has occurred.’' [FN100]
Post-Lingle cases generally agree that lower courts must apply Penn Central to partial
regulatory takings cases, but are divided as to the application of the Penn Central
“character” factor. These cases fall into three categories: (1) cases reaffirming the
“private harm/public interest” balancing test, (2) cases holding that the “character” factor
is limited to physical invasions and similar situations, and (3) cases redefining the
“character” factor as an inquiry into whether a small number of property owners have
been unfairly burdened by a government regulation. [FN101]
At least one post-Lingle decision reaffirmed the view that courts may balance the
public interest furthered by a regulation against its impact on takings plaintiffs. In Adams
v. Village of Wesley Chapel, landowners challenged a zoning ordinance that limited the
number of lots into which their property could be subdivided. [FN102] The U.S. District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina rejected the landowners' takings claim
based on Penn Central. [FN103] As to the “character” factor, the court explained:
The Supreme Court has long recognized the legitimacy of local governments seeking
to protect against overcrowding and preserving the character of their areas. Here, the
Village enacted a land use restriction with the stated purpose “to provide for residential
development at low densities consistent with suitability of the land and the rural character
of the village.” [FN104] In other words, the court held that the “character” factor favored
the government because its regulation effectively served a legitimate public purpose-limiting density in order to prevent overcrowding.
On the other hand, some decisions suggest that the “character” factor is primarily
relevant to cases involving physical invasion of property. [FN105] For example, in RAR
Development Associates v. New Jersey School Construction Corp. (RAR), the state of
New Jersey announced plans to acquire a landowner's property and subsidized the

relocation of one of the landowner's tenants. [FN106] Eventually, the state decided not to
acquire the property, causing the landowner to be stuck with the land but no tenant.
[FN107] The landowner claimed that the inducements the government gave to the tenant
to vacate the property constituted a taking because they effectively deprived the
landowner of a tenant. [FN108]
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, noted that the “character”
factor “focuses primarily on whether the conduct ‘amounts to a physical invasion.”’
[FN109] The court upheld the government's action because its relocation assistance “did
not cause a substantial destruction of the property's beneficial use.” [FN110] The state
merely tried to acquire property for school construction in an orderly manner by
providing affected persons with relocation assistance as early as possible. [FN111]
Because the infringement was so minor, the court never actually applied the “character”
factor. Thus, the RAR decision implies that the “character” factor might be relevant only
to takings actions involving a physical invasion of property by the government. [FN112]
A third group of cases focuses on whether “the burden of the regulation falls
disproportionately on relatively few property owners.” [FN113] For example, in
Wensmann Realty v. City of Eagan, a landowner sought to build houses on property
zoned for a golf course and filed a lawsuit after the city rejected its application for
rezoning. [FN114] The court interpreted the Lingle Court's statement that takings
jurisprudence should consider “how that burden is allocated” [FN115] to mean that courts
should not balance the harm to a takings plaintiff against the public interest favoring
regulation because “the appropriate focus of the character inquiry should be on the nature
rather than on the merit of the governmental action.” [FN116] Therefore, the court
asserted that “an important consideration involves whether the regulation is general in
application or whether the burden of the regulation falls disproportionately on relatively
few property owners.” [FN117] In other words, Wensmann suggests that, in some
circumstances, the “character” factor favors compensation when only a few owners are
harmed by government regulation and disfavors compensation when the burden of
regulation is widely distributed across society. [FN118]
Applying this standard, the court held that the “character” factor favored the
landowner for two reasons. First, only a few private property owners were subject to the
zoning category that included golf courses (“Parks, Open Space, and Regulation”).
[FN119] Second, the city allowed other land near the golf course to be used for
residential development. [FN120] Thus, the costs of regulation disproportionately
affected the plaintiff rather than being allocated broadly across society. [FN121]
III. Why Precedent Favors a “Private Harm/Public Interest” Balancing Test
As explained above, the weight of pre-Lingle precedent interprets the Penn Central
“character of the government action” factor to support consideration of the public interest
favoring regulation. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Palazzolo endorsed this view, as
did the Court's opinion in Tahoe-Sierra.
Moreover, Lingle itself may reaffirm the “private harm/public interest” test. As noted
above, the Lingle Court stated that “the ‘character of the government action'--for instance
whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests
through ‘some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to

promote the common good'--may be relevant in discerning whether a taking has
occurred.’' [FN122] The Lingle Court's reference to the “common good” suggests that the
extent to which a regulation in fact “promotes the common good” is relevant to the
“character” factor.
Yet several commentators argue that Lingle bars any inquiry into the broader public
interests supporting regulation. Some contend that Lingle implicitly eliminates the
“character of the government action” factor altogether, [FN123] while others suggest that
Lingle radically redefined the “character” factor. [FN124]
A. Does Character Count at All?
The Lingle Court noted that its rejection of Agins “[did] not require [the Court] to
disturb any of [its] prior holdings” [FN125] (other than, presumably, Agins itself).
Nevertheless, Professor Dale Whitman argues that “if Lingle is taken seriously, it appears
to destroy the ‘character of the governmental action’ prong of the Penn Central takings
test.” [FN126] In support of this statement, Whitman focuses on the Lingle Court's
statement that Penn Central “focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that
government imposes upon private property rights.” [FN127] According to Whitman, this
statement excludes inquiry into “the government's reasons or motivations for taking
regulatory action.” [FN128]
But the Lingle Court's statement that Penn Central “focuses directly upon the severity
of the burden” [FN129] need not necessarily bar consideration of other factors, such as
the character of the government action. Considering that two of the three Penn Central
factors address the burden of government regulation on the plaintiff, [FN130] the Penn
Central Court most likely intended to focus on that burden. But emphasizing the burden
on takings plaintiffs does not require courts to focus solely on that burden. Both the Penn
Central and Lingle Courts' explicit references to “the character of the government action”
[FN131] suggest otherwise.
Whitman also relies on the Lingle Court's statement that Penn Central “turns in large
part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation's economic impact and the
degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests.” [FN132] According to
Whitman, this “language omits any reference to the third prong of Penn Central, the
‘character’ test, and it inserts the [“not exclusively” ] language precisely because, I
suspect, O'Connor [the author of Lingle] realized that the unmentioned ‘character’ prong
was inconsistent with the Lingle opinion and could not survive it.” [FN133] In other
words, Whitman argues that when the Court said liability does “not exclusively” turn on
the two “harm to plaintiff” factors (economic impact and interference with investmentbacked expectations), then it must have meant that liability does exclusively turn on those
factors. But the Court said that takings cases do “not exclusively” depend on the two
“harm to plaintiff” factors, thus it must have intended another factor to be relevant; and
by reiterating its commitment to the “character” factor, [FN134] the Court seemingly
held that the character of the government action is the third factor.
Professor Eric Pearson, by contrast, concedes that Lingle explicitly reaffirmed the
Penn Central “character” factor, [FN135] but nevertheless argues that Lingle “effectively
eviscerates the ‘character of the government action’ factor of Penn Central.” [FN136]
Pearson reasons that the character factor and the Agins “substantially advance” test
“inquire of the behavior of government rather than of the harm to property that behavior

might produce.” [FN137] Thus, both tests “reside in the universe of substantive due
process. . . . Given that identity of purpose and effect, Lingle's condemnation of the
Agins test per force condemns the Penn Central character factor as well.” [FN138]
But there is a difference between the Penn Central and Agins tests. The Lingle Court
suggested that under the Agins “substantially advance” test, the constitutionality of a
government regulation rests solely on its rationality, regardless of its impact on private
property owners. [FN139] By contrast, the Penn Central test considers the character of
government action as just one factor among several. [FN140] Thus, the balancing test is
no more identical to substantive due process than is any of the other balancing tests
within constitutional jurisprudence. [FN141] If Penn Central is identical to substantive
due process, so are balancing tests in (for example) the First Amendment context.
To understand the difference between substantive due process and a true balancing
test, imagine the following hypothetical: suppose the government has an excellent reason
to enact a regulation that reduces the value of a landowner's property by ninety percent.
Under the “substantially advance” test, the landowner's takings claim fails; the
government prevails because it had a substantial basis for its decision. By contrast, under
a “private harm/public interest” balancing test, the government's excellent reason would
be balanced against the burden it imposes on the plaintiff, which means that the
government might actually lose the case. Thus, the substantive due process/”
substantially advance” test rejected in Lingle is quite different from the balancing test
that Pearson criticizes. Moreover, Lingle does not preclude the latter test.
Professor Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson, and Guillermo Montero argue that even
if substantive due process could be distinguished in theory from the “private harm/public
interest” balancing test, the Lingle Court itself equated the two standards. [FN142] The
authors rely on the following language from Lingle:
[W]hether a regulation of private property is effective in achieving some legitimate
public purpose . . . has some logic in the context of a due process challenge . . . [b]ut such
a test is not a valid method of discerning whether private property has been ‘taken’ for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. [FN143] But a look at the full context of the quoted
language yields a more nuanced conclusion. Starting from the beginning of the first
quoted sentence, the relevant portion of Lingle reads:
Although Agins' reliance on due process precedents is understandable, the language
the Court selected was regrettably imprecise. The “substantially advances” formula
suggests a means-ends test: It asks, in essence, whether a regulation of private property is
effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose. An inquiry of this nature has some
logic in the context of a due process challenge, for a regulation that fails to serve any
legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of
the Due Process Clause. But such a test is not a valid method of discerning whether
private property has been “taken” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. [FN144] The
quoted language undeniably rejects the idea that any regulation satisfying due process
(i.e. any non-arbitrary regulation) is also permissible under the Takings Clause. But
Lingle did not reject the balancing test proposed by Justice O'Connor in Palazzolo, which
treats the regulation's effectiveness in achieving a public purpose as just one of numerous
factors to be considered in ascertaining the validity of the regulation. [FN145] Under the
“substantially advances” formula, any truly legitimate purpose that in fact supports a
regulation automatically safeguards the government against takings claims. But under the

“private harm/public interest” balancing test, a regulation's legitimate purpose is merely
part of the mix of factors to be considered by the courts.
B. If the “Character” Element Survives Lingle, What Does It Mean?
Given that Lingle retains the three-part Penn Central test, does it allow lower courts
to consider the legitimacy of state interests as part of the “character of the government
action” assessment? There are two reasons to believe that it does.
First, the Lingle Court itself suggested that whether a regulation “affects property
interests through ‘some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good”’ may be a relevant consideration in the “character”
analysis. [FN146] This language implies that a regulation's effectiveness in facilitating
the “common good” may be relevant when assessing its “character.” Second, Justice
O'Connor, the same Justice who most vigorously affirmed the “private harm/public
interest” balancing test in Palazzolo, [FN147] wrote the majority opinion in Lingle.
[FN148] If Justice O'Connor intended an about-face, she probably would have been more
explicit about her choice.
Nevertheless, numerous commentators argue that the Lingle Court repudiated the test
balancing the public interest against the plaintiff's regulation-related harm in takings
actions. Some argue that Lingle limited the “character” factor to physical occupations of
property by government, [FN149] while others argue that Lingle redefined the
“character” factor as a requirement that courts focus on whether regulation
disproportionately burdens a small group of property owners. [FN150] The following
analysis will address each of these theories.
1. Does Lingle Limit the “Character” Factor to “Physical Invasions” ?
In their hornbook on land use, Juergensmeyer and Roberts state,
In Lingle, the Court did not refer to a multi-factor balancing test. Rather, when
reciting the Penn Central factors, the Lingle Court gave a physical invasion as its
example of the character factor [and therefore] the government ought not be able to argue
the importance of its regulation's purpose in defense. [FN151] Similarly, the New Jersey
Superior Court, Appellate Division, stated that the “character” factor “focuses primarily
on whether the conduct ‘amounts to a physical invasion.”’ [FN152] Such references
appear to emanate from the following passage in Lingle: “the ‘character of the
governmental action'--for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead
merely affects property interests through ‘some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good'--may be relevant in discerning
whether a taking has occurred.’' [FN153]
If the Lingle Court intended to hold that the “character” factor was relevant only to
physical invasions, it could have done so quite easily by writing: “The ‘character of the
government action’ factor means that a taking has presumably occurred if government
action amounts to a physical invasion, but is irrelevant if no physical invasion occurred.”
Instead, the Court created a dichotomy between regulations amounting to a physical
invasion, which are more likely to be considered takings, [FN154] and public programs
“adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”
[FN155] It follows that even after Lingle, courts may weigh a regulation's effect on the
“common good” against the economic harm it causes.
2. Does Lingle Redefine “Character” as an Unfair Burden?

The Lingle Court noted that one reason it rejected the “substantially advance” test
was because the “inquiry reveals nothing about the magnitude or character of the burden
a particular regulation imposes upon private property rights. Nor does it provide any
information about how any regulatory burden is distributed among property owners.”
[FN156] According to Christopher Goodin, this language means that because the
effectiveness of a regulation in achieving a legitimate public purpose “does not reveal
either the burdens imposed or the benefits conferred by a regulation . . . inquiry into
effectiveness of a regulation is invalid in the context of takings challenges.” [FN157]
Goodin points out the Lingle Court's statement that “[t]he owner of a property subject to
a regulation that effectively serves a legitimate state interest may be just as singled out
and just as burdened as the owner of a property subject to an ineffective regulation.”
[FN158]
In other words, Goodin seems to adopt the following syllogism:
Premise 1: In regulatory takings actions, courts may consider the question of whether
government regulation singles out a property owner for an unfair burden--a principle
violated by the “substantially advance” test.
Premise 2: A “private harm/public interest” balancing test fails to adequately address
the question of whether a regulation singles out a property owner for an unfair burden.
Thus, it is just as inconsistent with Lingle as the “substantially advance” test.
Conclusion: The Lingle Court therefore would reject such a balancing test.
Premise 1 is undeniably supported by the Penn Central Court's statement that the
Takings Clause is “designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole,” [FN159] and therefore a taking occurs “when ‘justice and fairness' require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.” [FN160] Thus, the
Takings Clause does not bar consideration of whether a property owner was singled out
for regulation. [FN161]
But Premise 2 is flawed. Even a balancing test that considers the public purpose
supporting a government regulation can consider the fairness of burdening a small group
of property owners to further that public purpose. As Justice O'Connor wrote in her
Palazzolo concurrence:
[T]his constitutional guarantee is “‘designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.”’ The concepts of “fairness and justice” that underlie the Takings
Clause, of course, are less than fully determinate. Accordingly, we have eschewed “any
‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness' require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.” . . .
We have “identified several factors that have particular significance” in these
“essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.” Two such factors are “[t]he economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.” Another is “the character of the
governmental action.” The purposes served, as well as the effects produced, by a
particular regulation inform the takings analysis. [FN162]

In the first few sentences of the above passage, Justice O'Connor emphasizes that the
Takings Clause is designed to prevent “forcing some people alone to bear burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” [FN163] But she
then proceeds to cite to sources which state that in deciding what fairness requires, courts
may consider “the purposes and economic effects of government actions.” [FN164] Thus,
Justice O'Connor saw no contradiction between protecting property owners from unfair
burdens and weighing the state interests that justify those burdens.
Justice O'Connor's view makes sense. Even if courts do not address the existence of
unfair burdens when addressing the “character” factor, such unfairness may be relevant
when analyzing the “economic harm to the property owner” element of Penn Central.
[FN165] If a land use regulation reduces a plaintiff's property value by ninety percent,
the plaintiff has likely been disproportionately burdened--unless every nearby owner of
similar property has also suffered a ninety percent loss due to government regulation, a
result that is likely to occur only when the plaintiff seeks to use his land in the same way
as all owners of similar property. [FN166]
Two hypothetical situations illustrate how land use regulation that singles out a
landowner for disproportionate burdens is likely to be accompanied by a significant
economic impact upon that plaintiff. In case A, landowner A lost fifty percent of her
property's resale value due to a government regulation restricting development. But
nearby landowners suffered similar losses. In this situation, A's land may be less
marketable than before in comparison to property in other cities, but her land is no less
marketable in relation to her neighbors' property.
In case B, landowner B's land lost fifty percent of its long-term resale value, but
unlike landowner A in the first hypothetical, B is the only property owner in her town
who cannot develop her land. Thus, “the burden of the regulation falls
disproportionately” [FN167] on B. In this case, landowner B is worse off not only in
absolute terms, but also in relation to other nearby landowners. Someone looking to buy
land in B's town will prefer other landowners' land to B's, because the former is not
restricted by government regulation. It logically follows that landowner B suffered a
greater economic harm than landowner A precisely because a land use regulation singled
out B.
This illustration demonstrates how, contrary to Premise 2 above, a “singled out”
plaintiff such as B has an unusually strong case under the “economic harm” prong of
Penn Central--even if the Court continues to focus the “character” prong on the public
interest justifying regulation. If courts indirectly consider B's interest in avoiding being
singled out under the “economic harm” prong of Penn Central, it is essentially double
counting to consider the same interest under the “character” prong. Accordingly, the
“private harm/public interest” balancing test is consistent with protecting singled out
property owners.
IV. But Is Balancing Interests Good Policy?
Given the apparent ambiguity of Lingle, lower courts may have discretion to consider
public policy in interpreting the “character” factor. As explained above, pre-Lingle courts
often balanced the economic harm government regulation imposed on a property owner,

the disruption to the property owner's investment-backed expectations, and the extent to
which the regulation effectively promoted the public interest. [FN168]
The affirmative case for continuing to follow this “private harm/public interest”
balancing test is simple: as long as courts are required to implement the inherently vague
Penn Central balancing test, [FN169] they should also consider the public interest
because it is something courts know how to do. In a wide variety of contexts, courts use
balancing tests to determine whether the broader public interest favors a plaintiff's claim
or a defendant's defense. [FN170] The fact that courts are accustomed to such balancing
favors treating the “character of the public action” as “the strength of the public interest
favoring the government's regulation,” either alone or in combination with other factors.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that either the “private harm/public interest”
balancing test should be rejected on other grounds or that alternative tests are just as
practical. The following analysis will address each of these contentions.
A. Is Balancing Fair?
Goodin contends that any balancing test that considers the purpose of a regulation
creates an unfair distinction between a landowner who loses property through eminent
domain and a landowner whose property is rendered less valuable by a less intrusive
regulation; specifically, he argues that if the public need does not immunize government
from its duty to compensate in an eminent domain action, there is no compelling reason
to treat regulatory takings actions differently. [FN171]
In fact, regulatory takings and eminent domain takings are quite different and should
be governed by different rules. In an eminent domain action, a landowner loses the
physical use of his property. The landowner's loss is so complete that it makes sense to
compensate him fully for his loss regardless of the public interest involved. By contrast, a
partial regulatory takings plaintiff can still use her land, even if she cannot exploit that
land to its full economic potential. Unless courts hold that reductions in value, or all
reductions above a certain level, [FN172] are always compensable, [FN173] they must
adopt some kind of test to determine which landowner losses are compensable takings
and which are not. This means that courts must treat partial regulatory takings differently
from eminent domain takings. The Supreme Court apparently agrees; Lingle and its
predecessors held that litigation involving a less-than-total loss is governed by the threefactor Penn Central test, rather than by rules governing eminent domain actions. [FN174]
B. Are the Alternatives Any Better?
Commentators who assert that Lingle rejects the “private harm/public interest”
balancing test generally propose defining the “character of the government action” prong
as an analysis of (a) the government action's similarity to physical invasions and/or other
government actions generally recognized as takings, and (b) the extent to which the
government action singled out a small number of property owners for regulation.
[FN175] The following analysis argues that these proposed standards are either less
practical than the “private harm/public interest” test or harder to square with Supreme
Court precedent.
1. The Problem with “Physical Invasion” Tests

Lawson and his colleagues assert that the most plausible understanding of the
“character” factor is that “it is designed to evaluate the extent to which the government
action resembles what has been uncontroversially understood to constitute a taking.”
[FN176] They contend that
it is sensible to envision a continuum along which government actions at one end,
such as permanent physical occupations, effect a taking per se because they closely
resemble the formal exercise of the eminent domain power, whereas government actions
at the other end, such as routine land use regulations, almost certainly would not effect a
taking. [FN177] Under this approach, if a regulation somehow resembles a permanent
physical occupation, the “character” factor kicks in. If not, the “character” factor is
irrelevant.
This version of the “character” test is fairly easy to apply when the government
temporarily occupies property. [FN178] In that situation, a court can define the
“character” factor as the length of the occupation and then balance it against the
economic loss to the plaintiff: high economic loss [FN179] plus long occupation equals a
taking; low economic loss plus short occupation equals no taking; high economic loss
plus short occupation, or low economic loss plus long occupation, equals a close case.
But what if a landowner challenges a development restriction rather than a physical
occupation? In that case, according to Lawson and his colleagues, the government's
action is presumably a “routine land use regulation” in which case the “character” factor
disappears and there is nothing against which to weigh the two “harm to plaintiff” factors
(economic impact plus disruption of investment-backed expectations). How can courts
weigh two similar factors against nothing? Only by dramatically reshaping Penn Central.
For example, courts could hold that if the landowner's losses exceed a certain
threshold amount, [FN180] a taking exists, even though the “character” factor is
irrelevant. But in Palazzolo, the Court indicated that compensation may not be necessary
even when the regulation caused a ninety-three percent loss in property value. [FN181]
Thus, such a test might be difficult to square with Supreme Court precedent.
Alternatively, courts could hold that there is presumptively no taking if a landowner
suffers a less-than-total loss in value from “routine” regulation, because the “character”
factor is irrelevant and the landowner's interests are not strong enough to support his
takings claim. [FN182] This rule would certainly be easy to apply, but it would be
inconsistent with the Penn Central Court's intent to base regulatory takings decisions on
“essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.” [FN183] The Lingle Court indicated that it agreed
with Penn Central's assertion that it was “unable to develop any ‘set formula for
evaluating regulatory takings claims.”’ [FN184] Thus, Lingle also seems to prefer ad hoc
balancing to “bright line” tests. Accordingly, any attempt to draw a line between physical
occupations and “routine” regulations might be inconsistent with both Penn Central and
Lingle.
2. Pure Reciprocity and “Reciprocity Plus”
Numerous commentators define the “character” factor as reciprocity--the extent to
which the burdens of regulation are fairly shared across the population. This test has the
advantage of being at least somewhat consistent with precedent; the Court has repeatedly
referred to reciprocity in its Takings Clause decisions. [FN185] But the major
reciprocity-based tests that have been proposed add additional levels of complexity to an

already complex status quo and add little value to the simpler balancing test proposed
above. Goodin and John Echeverria proposed the most detailed reciprocity-based tests.
Goodin argues that a regulation's fairness should be inferred from five factors:
(1) Reciprocity of advantage. That is, whether a takings plaintiff benefits from other
regulations, [FN186] or “has been unfairly singled out to shoulder a disproportionate
share of public burdens without corresponding benefits.” [FN187]
(2) Whether a regulation abrogates a basic property right, such as the rights of
“exclusive possession, use, and disposition.” [FN188]
(3) Whether a plaintiff voluntarily assumes a regulatory burden. [FN189]
(4) Whether a plaintiff's proposed land use constitutes a nuisance. [FN190]
(5) The existence of “rational retroactivity.” That is, to the extent regulation is
retroactive, whether past benefits implicitly compensate a takings plaintiff for any harm
done by regulation. [FN191]
In other words, Goodin proposes five factors for the final prong of the three-part Penn
Central test, thereby multiplying the complexity of the law. Moreover, not all of these
elements are tremendously clear. How can a court decide when a land use regulation
creates “reciprocity of advantage” ? Goodin asserts that “[s]o long as the ordinance
applies broadly to other people in the surrounding community, the landowner is also
benefitted by the restrictions that the ordinance places upon his neighbors.” [FN192] But
how broadly should one define these restrictions? Does reciprocity exist whenever a
burdened landowner's neighbors are covered by some sort of zoning regulation? [FN193]
Does it exist only when the landowner's neighbors are subject to the identical zoning
classification? [FN194] Or does it exist only when the plaintiff's neighbors suffer just as
much from the zoning classification as the plaintiff? And which landowners should be
included in the group “burdened” by the zoning regulation--all landowners covered by
the regulation, only those who have lost some value, or only those who have lost the most
value? [FN195]
And when is government regulation “voluntarily assumed” by a plaintiff? The only
relevant land-use regulation case cited by Goodin, [FN196] Yee v. City of Escondido,
upheld a rent control ordinance and noted that the landlords “voluntarily rented their land
to [tenants].” [FN197] Goodin notes that the landlords “implicitly accepted the
restrictions imposed upon them by . . . failing to seek a zoning change.” [FN198] Does
this mean that a landowner automatically accepts the regulatory status quo if he or she
fails to seek a rezoning? And if so, does this mean that the “character” factor will
normally favor a takings plaintiff who unsuccessfully seeks a rezoning?
Echeverria proposes a seemingly less complex two-part “reciprocity plus” test,
arguing that, except in certain unusual circumstances, [FN199] the “character” element of
Penn Central requires courts to examine (a) reciprocity (i.e., “whether the regulation
targets one or a few owners or is more general in application”) [FN200] and (b) “whether
a regulation is benefit-conferring or harm-preventing.” [FN201]
As to the first factor, Echeverria provides a simple example: if a community creates
an agricultural zone to limit development, but the zone encompasses only one farm, the
“character” factor supports the farmer's takings claim. [FN202] But the extent to which a
landowner is disproportionately burdened may not always be so clear. Suppose, for
example, that there are ten homeowners on a block zoned for low-density residential
property. One of the homeowners wishes to build a slightly higher density residence--for

example, by adding an extra room to be used as a rental unit. The zoning regulation
precludes this renovation, which reduces the potential resale value of the homeowner's
property by ten percent. A second homeowner wants to demolish her house and build a
factory. The zoning regulation prohibits this project, which reduces the potential resale
value of the property by ninety percent.
Even if the two homeowners are the only people burdened by the low-density zoning
regulation, [FN203] the proper fate of their possible takings claims is unclear. Were both
homeowners equally burdened? Or is the more ambitious homeowner--the one who
wanted to build a factory--more heavily burdened? If the former is correct, then two
different situations are being treated the same. If the latter is correct, then the homeowner
who seeks to radically change the neighborhood is in a stronger litigating position than
the one who wishes to make a small improvement--hardly a desirable result. [FN204] In
sum, there will often be no easy way to determine if a regulation evenly distributes
burdens. [FN205]
A second weakness of focusing on benefits and burdens is the difficulty of deciding
whether a regulation both benefited and burdened an individual takings plaintiff. In
particular, Echeverria argues that the “reciprocity of advantage cannot logically be
confined to examining the countervailing benefits produced by the specific regulation
under challenge,” [FN206] because a plaintiff may also benefit from other regulations.
For example, a landowner burdened by wetlands regulation may benefit from historicpreservation laws, or vice versa. [FN207] Thus, “considering all the countervailing
benefits of different regulatory programs may make it virtually impossible to determine
whether a regulated party is suffering a net loss from all of society's regulated programs.”
[FN208]
So how does Echeverria resolve this problem? By asking courts to consider the public
interest favoring regulation--not directly, but as a means of determining the reciprocal
benefit that regulation provides to a property owner. He explains that
[t]he magnitude of these reciprocal benefits will depend in substantial part on the
public importance and value of the objective served by the regulations. So long as a
regulation applies broadly across the community, the value or importance of what the
government is seeking to accomplish should weigh against the takings claim. [FN209]
Thus, Echeverria asks judges to consider the benefits that a particular regulation provided
a property owner but acknowledges that the only way to do so is by determining the
strength of the public interest supporting the regulation--essentially adding an extra step
to an already complex Takings Clause inquiry.
The other element of Echeverria's reciprocity-based test is whether a regulation is
designed to confer benefits or prevent harm to the public. Echeverria contends that this
distinction is important because, “while it will sometimes make sense to require those
who benefit from regulation to redistribute the gains to those burdened by the regulations,
it will generally make less sense to require those protected from harm to pay those who
have been restrained from harming others and the community.” [FN210] Echeverria
essentially makes a public-interest argument: “harm-preventing” regulations are
supported by a stronger public interest than “benefit-conferring” ones.
Few courts, however, are likely to adopt the “harm/benefit” distinction that
Echeverria proposes. As Echeverria concedes, the Supreme Court's majority opinion in
Lucas “disparaged the entire notion that benefit-conferring regulations could be

distinguished, ‘on an objective, value-free-basis,’ from harm-preventing regulations.”
[FN211] Echeverria correctly notes that this language does not completely foreclose his
theory, because Lucas was not decided under the Penn Central balancing test. [FN212]
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would adopt a distinction in the
Penn Central context that it criticized in Lucas.
Ultimately, Echeverria's two-factor test requires courts to focus on the weight of the
public interest supporting regulation. Thus, in most situations, his test will likely render
the same results as the “private harm/public interest” balancing test, and it has the added
drawbacks of being more complex and requiring the courts to go through some extra
steps.
V. How to Consider the Public Interest
For the reasons stated above, courts analyzing the “character” factor should consider
the public interest supporting the alleged taking. But this principle alone does not give
courts much guidance. Given that the courts should weigh the public interest supporting a
regulation, how precisely should they do it? And should considerationof the public
interest bar courts from using other criteria discussed above as part of the “character”
analysis?
A. How to Weigh the Public Interest
The recent case of Resource Investments, Inc. v. United States [FN213] provides a
helpful illustration of how to properly weigh the nature of the public interest. In Resource
Investments, two landowners built a landfill on a site containing wetlands, but only after
spending nearly a decade trying to obtain state and federal permits. [FN214] The
plaintiffs asserted that certain procedural steps imposed by the federal government
constituted a compensable taking. [FN215]
The Court of Federal Claims denied the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment, holding that there was a genuine factual dispute about whether the “character”
factor weighed in favor of the plaintiffs or the government. [FN216] The court began by
noting that courts must “weigh the benefits, burdens, and distribution of a regulatory
burden as part of this prong. This requires an ‘inquir[y] into the degree of harm created
by the claimant's proposed activity, its social value and location, and the ease with which
any harm stemming from it could be prevented.”’ [FN217]
Applying this test, the court found that the government's regulations advanced a
“valid public interest” [FN218] because they were designed to protect wetlands and
nearby navigable waters from pollution. [FN219] In particular, the government needed to
regulate landfills because landfills sometimes contaminate nearby groundwater. [FN220]
On the other hand, the court found that the risk of such contamination was “vanishingly
small,” [FN221] and the plaintiffs produced evidence “strongly suggesting that the
[government] treated them differently than other similarly-situated applicants.” [FN222]
These competing interests created a dispute of material fact sufficient to bar summary
judgment. [FN223]
The court's “character” analysis in Resource Investments focused not only on the
importance of the public purpose supporting the type of regulation at issue, but also on
the effectiveness of the regulation--that is, the extent to which the precise action taken by

the government furthered the stated public purpose. The court found that the general
purpose of landfill regulation (preventing water pollution) favored the government's
permit delays, [FN224] but also found that the low likelihood of actual pollution and the
apparent arbitrariness of government decision making favored the plaintiffs' claim.
[FN225] Thus, the government cannot avoid liability merely by showing that the public
interest favored some sort of regulation; instead, it must show that the policies support
both regulation in general and its specific conduct in the case at issue.
B. What About Physical Invasions and Singled-Out Plaintiffs?
The analysis above seeks to show that in takings actions, courts should focus their
“character” analysis on whether the public interest supported the government regulation
at issue. But this conclusion leaves open the question of whether the courts should focus
exclusively on this factor or consider additional factors raised by lower courts in the past-most notably, whether the regulation is similar to a physical invasion, and the extent to
which the plaintiff was “singled out” for regulation.
The Lingle Court resolved the first issue when it stated that “‘the character of the
government action'--for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead
merely affects property interests through ‘some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good'--may be relevant in discerning
whether a taking has occurred.’' [FN226] This language clearly indicates that the
“character” factor requires courts to decide whether government conduct “amounts to a
physical invasion.” [FN227] If so, the government's conduct is more likely to be a taking.
[FN228] If not, the plaintiff's takings claim is more likely to fail.
The second issue is more complex. As noted above, [FN229] it is difficult to know
whether a regulation singles out a property owner or whether it distributes a burden fairly
and evenly among property owners. On the other hand, it is well settled that the Takings
Clause is meant “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”
[FN230] Thus, the extent to which a property owner is “singled out” for an unfair burden
cannot be completely irrelevant in Takings Clause jurisprudence.
But this does not mean that the existence (or lack thereof) of an unfair burden needs
to be a fourth element of a Penn Central-based balancing test, nor does it mean that the
“character” factor will generally require analysis of such unfairness. As explained above,
[FN231] a property owner who has been unfairly burdened by government regulation is
likely to have suffered a large economic loss, while a property owner who suffered a
minimal economic loss is not as likely to have been singled out for excessive regulation.
So even if a property owner can credibly claim to have been singled out, to consider this
fact under the “character” prong of Penn Central may lead to double-counting, that is,
considering the same fact--the property owner's economic harm from being singled out
for overregulation--under both the “character” prong and the “economic harm” prong.
Admittedly, disproportionate economic burden is not the only way to determine
whether a property owner has been “singled out” for unfair regulation. For example, in
Resource Investments, the plaintiffs claimed that the government “treated them
differently than other similarly-situated applicants.” [FN232] In theory, such unfair
treatment could exist even if the government's unfairness did not massively reduce the
plaintiff's property values. But in that a situation, the court could follow Resource

Investments and do what the Court of Federal Claims did: treat the defendant's unfair
burden as part of the “public interest” discussion, because a government action that is
preposterously overinclusive or underinclusive is obviously not going to be particularly
effective in promoting the public interest.
For example, suppose a real estate developer claims that the government allows
development firms with brown-haired executives to fill in wetlands, but denies similar
permits to firms with black-haired executives. Such an arbitrary regulatory scheme is
unlikely to be an effective means of protecting wetlands.
A regulation that singles out a small number of property owners for excessive
regulation is likely to create great economic harm to those property owners, which
supports finding liability under the “economic harm” prong of Penn Central. Such a
regulation may also be so inordinately underinclusive or overinclusive that it might not
be truly effective in promoting the public interest, which supports finding liability under
the “character” prong of Penn Central. Thus, a “public interest/private harm” balancing
test does not preclude consideration of whether a landowner has been unfairly burdened
by regulation.
In sum, courts' “character” factor analysis should proceed as follows:
(1) If a regulation amounts to a physical invasion, then the “character” factor most
likely supports a taking.
(2) Otherwise, courts should focus on the public interest at stake--not just whether the
government has a legitimate purpose for its conduct, but the extent to which the specific
regulation effectively promotes that purpose. The government will want to show that its
actions created a high level of public benefit and/or prevented a significant public harm.
By contrast, a takings plaintiff will want to show that the regulation produces minimal
benefits.
VI. Conclusion
Under Penn Central, courts must resolve regulatory takings actions by weighing the
economic impact the regulation imposes on the claimant, the regulation's interference
with the claimant's investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government
action. [FN233] Before Lingle, many courts considered the weight of the government
purpose supporting regulation and the regulation's usefulness in achieving that purpose
under the “character” prong of Penn Central.
The Lingle Court stated that in evaluating the “character” factor, courts should focus
on whether governmental action “amounts to a physical invasion” or “adjusts the benefits
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” [FN234] Thus, it appears
that when government action involves a physical invasion, the “character” factor clearly
favors a takings claimant. But the Court's reference to government regulation that
“promote[s] the common good” suggests that courts should also continue to consider the
extent to which the challenged program in fact supports the common good.
Numerous post-Lingle courts and commentators assert that Lingle either eliminates
the “character” factor or requires that it be reinterpreted to focus on the extent to which
government has unfairly burdened a takings plaintiff. But, given the language quoted
above, there is no reason to believe that Lingle mandates such results. Nor is there any
reason to believe that these alternative frameworks would make Takings Clause litigation

less confusing. Accordingly, courts should continue to follow pre-Lingle precedent
holding that the “character” factor includes the public interest supporting the government
action at issue.
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then must be weighed against the loss”). The “loss” component of this test includes both
the “economic impact” and “investment-backed expectations” factors of the Penn Central
test. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
[FN9]. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 8, §10.6, at 430; see, e.g., Bass Enters.
Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (using such a standard); see
also infra note 76 (citing examples).
[FN10]. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).

[FN11]. Id. at 540.
[FN12]. See infra Part IV.
[FN13]. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 8, §10.4, at 420.
[FN14]. See id. §10.6, at 430.
[FN15]. See infra Part IV.A.
[FN16]. See infra Part IV.B.
[FN17]. See infra Part V.
[FN18]. Id.
[FN19]. Cf. Stephen M. Durden, Animal Farm Jurisprudence: Hiding Personal
Predilections Behind the “Plain Language” of the Takings Clause, 25 Pace Envtl. L. Rev.
355, 372-74 (2008) (noting the diversity of scholarly opinions as to the proper scope of
the Takings Clause; the most pro-regulation commentators argue that only physical
appropriation of property by the government is a “taking,” while some libertarian-minded
commentators claim that all government regulations are “takings”); James W. Ely, Jr.,
“Poor Relation” Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing Rights of Property
Owners, 2005 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 39, 45 (arguing that the Penn Central test's
“indeterminate factors provide little guidance to individuals”).
[FN20]. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); infra Part II.A.
[FN21]. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978); infra notes 3442 and accompanying text.
[FN22]. See infra notes 62-87 and accompanying text.
[FN23]. See infra Part II.C.
[FN24]. See Callies, Freilich & Roberts, supra note 2, at 320 (noting that Pennsylvania
Coal “generally is viewed as the origin of the regulatory takings doctrine”).
[FN25]. 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see Callies, Freilich & Roberts, supra note 2, at 320.
[FN26]. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 412-13. The coal company owned the mineral rights to
land beneath a house and sought to exercise those rights to dig out coal. Id. at 412.
[FN27]. Id. at 415 (emphasis added).

[FN28]. Id. at 413.
[FN29]. Id. at 414-15.
[FN30]. Id. at 414.
[FN31]. Id. at 413.
[FN32]. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414.
[FN33]. Id.
[FN34]. See Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 8, §10.4, at 417 (describing Penn
Central as “[t]he next important regulatory takings decision”).
[FN35]. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
[FN36]. Id. at 116.
[FN37]. Id. at 117.
[FN38]. Id. at 119, 130.
[FN39]. Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
[FN40]. Id. at 136 (finding that the “[s]everity of the impact of the law” did not support
takings claim because the law “does not interfere in any way with the present uses of the
Terminal” and allowed the landowner “not only to profit from the Terminal but also to
obtain a ‘reasonable return’ on its investment”).
[FN41]. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130 n.27 (discussing case law that required
the Court to reject the claim “that full use of air rights is so bound up with the
investment-backed expectations of appellants that government deprivation of these rights
invariably ... constitutes a taking”) (emphasis added). The Court also noted that because
the law at issue did not interfere with the property's current use as a railroad terminal, it
“does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation
concerning the use of the parcel.” Id. at 136.
[FN42]. Id. at 138.
[FN43]. 480 U.S. 470.
[FN44]. Id. at 478.
[FN45]. Id. at 476-77.

[FN46]. Id. at 477.
[FN47]. See id. at 476-77 n.6.
[FN48]. Id. at 481, 485.
[FN49]. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 496.
[FN50]. Id. at 499-500 n.27.
[FN51]. Id. at 499.
[FN52]. Id. at 485.
[FN53]. Id. at 486.
[FN54]. Id. at 488.
[FN55]. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 492 (citing Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980)). Note, however, that the Court's direct statement
to this effect is of questionable precedential value, because the Court cited the nowoverruled Agins decision. See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text (discussing the
Lingle Court's rejection of Agins).
[FN56]. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Agins, 447 U.S. 255.
[FN57]. Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
[FN58]. Id. at 261.
[FN59]. Id.
[FN60]. Id. at 261 n.8 (citing the city council's findings that urbanization might lead to
“‘air, noise and water pollution, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic beauty,
disturbance of the ecology and environment, hazards related to geology, fire and flood,
and other demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl”’) (quoting Tiburon, Cal.,
Ordinance No. 124 N.S. §1(c) (1973)).
[FN61]. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005) (suggesting that
Agins has been interpreted as a “stand-alone regulatory takings test that is wholly
independent of Penn Central”). Note, however, that some language in Agins suggests
otherwise. Later in its decision, the Agins Court pointed out that the benefits of the
zoning ordinance “must be considered along with any diminution in market value that the
appellants may suffer” and that the plaintiffs “are free to pursue their reasonable
investment expectations by submitting a development plan to local officials.” Agins, 447
U.S. at 262. Because Agins referred to the “harm to plaintiff” Penn Central factors

(economic impact on landowners and investment-backed expectations) at various points
in its decision, see id. at 262-63, it appears that the Agins Court might have actually
intended to apply Penn Central, rather than to create a stand-alone regulatory takings test.
[FN62]. 505 U.S. 1003, 1006-07, 1031-32.
[FN63]. Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original).
[FN64]. Id. at 1029. The Court explained that, even if regulation prohibits all
economically beneficial use of land, it is not a taking if the regulation
inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with
such an effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have
been achieved in the courts [by private plaintiffs] under the State's law of private
nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect
the public generally ....
Id.
[FN65]. Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(citing Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
[FN66]. Id. Note, however, that this theory was not the most plausible interpretation of
Lucas, given the Lucas Court's own suggestion that, under Penn Central, “in at least some
cases the landowner with 95% loss will get nothing, while the landowner with total loss
will recover in full.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 n.8.
[FN67]. 533 U.S. 606.
[FN68]. Id. at 617.
[FN69]. Id.
[FN70]. Four Justices dissented, but both the plurality opinion and O'Connor's
concurrence reached their decision on grounds unrelated to the “character” factor.
Compare id. at 630 (plurality opinion) (remanding the case because the “claim [was] not
barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed
restriction”) with id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting the view that state of
title at the time plaintiff acquired property barred claim under “investment-backed
expectations” factor). Thus, even if Justice O'Connor's opinion is treated as the opinion of
the Court, her discussion of the “character” factor might be viewed as dictum.
[FN71]. Id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519,
523 (1992)).
[FN72]. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).

[FN73]. See id. at 320-21. The Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that “the mere
enactment of a temporary regulation that, while in effect, denies a property owner all
economically beneficial use of her property gives rise to an unqualified constitutional
obligation to compensate her for the value of its use during that period” and instead held
that such regulations are “best analyzed within the Penn Central framework.” Id.
[FN74]. Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
[FN75]. Id. The Court, however did not address the question of whether the restrictions at
issue were takings under Penn Central, holding only that the growth moratorium should
be evaluated under the Penn Central test. Id. at 317-18 (noting that the appropriate
outcome under Penn Central was not at issue before the Court, because the plaintiffs had
disavowed reliance on Penn Central); id. at 342 (concluding that “the [public] interest in
‘fairness and justice’ will be best served by relying on the familiar Penn Central approach
when deciding cases like this, rather than by attempting to craft a new categorical rule”).
Thus, the Court's interpretation of Penn Central is arguably dicta.
[FN76]. See infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text (discussing Bass Enterprises); see
also Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (denying
takings claim in part because the government action was “designed to protect health and
safety,” thus leaning the “character” factor in favor of the government); Leon County v.
Gluesenkamp, 873 So. 2d 460, 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“In determining the
character of the government action, courts must ... balance appellees' interests against the
County's needs to protect the public.”). But see K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl.
Quality, 705 N.W.2d 365, 384 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (focusing on “whether the
governmental regulation singles plaintiffs out to bear the burden for the public good and
whether the regulatory act being challenged here is a comprehensive, broadly based
regulatory scheme that benefits and burdens all citizens relatively equally”).
[FN77]. 381 F.3d 1360, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
[FN78]. Id. at 1363.
[FN79]. Id. at 1366-68 (describing possible dangers from drilling in more detail).
[FN80]. Id. at 1363-64.
[FN81]. Id. at 1364.
[FN82]. Id. at 1369.
[FN83]. Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 381 F.3d at 1369-70 (rejecting pre-Palazzolo Federal
Circuit precedent that did not treat Penn Central as good law and explaining that
Palazzolo “returned the temporary takings pendulum back to the familiar Penn Central
analysis that existed prior to Lucas”).

[FN84]. Id. at 1370.
[FN85]. Id.
[FN86]. Id.
[FN87]. See supra note 76.
[FN88]. 544 U.S. 528, 532-33 (2005).
[FN89]. Id. at 534 (citation omitted).
[FN90]. Id. at 531-32 (citations omitted).
[FN91]. Id. at 548.
[FN92]. These circumstances include government regulations that create a permanent
physical invasion of a landowner's property, regulations that render property
economically useless, and exactions (government attempts to force a landowner to
dedicate property to the public as a condition for obtaining a building permit). Id. at 538,
546-47.
[FN93]. Id. at 538.
[FN94]. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540-41.
[FN95]. Id. at 542 (emphasis omitted).
[FN96]. Id. at 541.
[FN97]. Id. at 538-39 (recognizing “the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations” as relevant factors under the Penn Central analysis
(quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978))).
[FN98]. Id. at 542.
[FN99]. Id. at 548.
[FN100]. Id. at 539.
[FN101]. See Giovenella v. Conservation Comm'n of Ashland, 857 N.E.2d 451, 462
(Mass. 2006) (noting that some courts have focused on whether a regulation unfairly
singles out a particular landowner while others have looked at whether a government
action resembles a physical invasion or whether the purpose of the regulation was to
mitigate harm to the public, and declining to resolve the issue because, under any of these

tests, no taking occurred).
[FN102]. No. 3:03cv411, 2006 WL 2689376, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 18, 2006); see also
Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1210 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that the
“character” factor supported a statute requiring landowners to allow visitors to store
firearms in their vehicles, because regulation was designed to prevent “[crimes] of
general applicability ‘concern[ing] protection of the community as a whole rather than
individual citizens”’).
[FN103]. Adams, 2006 WL 2689376, at *3.
[FN104]. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
[FN105]. See Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 134 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (“County's action did not physically invade or appropriate [plaintiff's]
property or groundwater. Accordingly, that factor does not support a taking.”); Kafka v.
Mont. Dep't of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 201 P.3d 8, 28 (Mont. 2008) (“[U]nder the
‘character of the governmental action’ prong courts should inquire concerning the
magnitude or character of the burden imposed by the regulation, and determine whether it
is functionally comparable to government appropriation or invasion of private
property.”); RAR Dev. Assocs. v. N.J. Sch. Constr. Corp., No. L-9424-05, 2008 WL
2663403, at *11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 9, 2008).
[FN106]. 2008 WL 2663403, at *1-2.
[FN107]. Id. at *2.
[FN108]. Id.
[FN109]. Id. at *11. Note that the court presumably referred to temporary physical
occupations, because a permanent physical occupation of property by government is
always a taking, and courts therefore need not apply the Penn Central test in such
situations. See id.
[FN110]. Id. at *13.
[FN111]. Id. at *13. The court explained,
The governmental action here consisted of a good faith effort by the State to act
within the confines of the relevant statutory sections and administrative regulations to
acquire property for the construction of a school. Extended lead time was needed for [the
tenant's] relocation, and the orderly process of the intended acquisition of plaintiff's
improved property necessitated its early provision of relocation assistance.
Id.
[FN112]. Because no reported cases have cited RAR, the precise scope of the New Jersey
court's holding remains unclear. Cf. infra Parts III.B.1, IV.B.1 (critiquing “physical

invasion” theory).
[FN113]. Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 639 (Minn. 2007);
see also Small Prop. Owners of S.F. v. City & County of S.F., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 121, 136
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding ordinance as “part of a broader scheme of allocating
economic benefits and burdens between landlords and tenants for the public good,” but
without directly addressing impact of Lingle on the “character” factor); cf. Tapps
Brewing Inc. v. City of Sumner, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1230 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (where
landowners challenged a city regulation forcing them to pay fees to fund an upgrade to
the city's pipe system, “character” factor supported city because “[p]laintiffs fail[ed] to
provide any evidence showing that the City has not required any other land owner to
upgrade the pipe system”).
[FN114]. 734 N.W.2d at 628-29.
[FN115]. Id. at 639 (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005)).
[FN116]. Id. (citations omitted).
[FN117]. Id. at 639.
[FN118]. See infra Parts III.B.2, IV.B.2 (critiquing this theory).
[FN119]. Wensmann Realty, Inc., 734 N.W.2d at 640.
[FN120]. Id.
[FN121]. Id.
[FN122]. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (emphasis added).
[FN123]. See infra Part III.A.
[FN124]. See infra Part III.B.
[FN125]. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545.
[FN126]. Dale A. Whitman, Deconstructing Lingle, Implications for Takings Doctrine,
40 J. Marshall L. Rev. 573, 574 (2007).
[FN127]. Id. at 581 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539).
[FN128]. Id.
[FN129]. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.

[FN130]. These factors are the “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investmentbacked expectations.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
[FN131]. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
[FN132]. Whitman, supra note 126, at 582 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540).
[FN133]. Id.
[FN134]. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
[FN135]. Eric Pearson, Some Thoughts on the Role of Substantive Due Process in the
Federal Constitutional Law of Property Rights Protection, 25 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 32
(2008).
[FN136]. Id.
[FN137]. Id.
[FN138]. Id.
[FN139]. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540-42 (2005).
[FN140]. See Pearson, supra note 135, at 25. Pearson contends that
Penn Central designates three factors for balancing--economic harm, interference
with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. The
problem is this: the first two factors ... relate to the exercise of government power in a
particular case. They inquire whether the government's regulation, when applied to an
individual, so harms that individual as to cause a taking. The character factor, on the
other hand, typically relates not at all to the specific exercise of government power
implicated in a case. Rather, this latter factor assesses the worthiness of a statute as a
general matter.
Id.
[FN141]. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 849 (2006) (describing Fourth
Amendment balancing of interests); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987)
(requiring a balancing of the parties' interests where a public employer terminated an
employee for engaging in speech and the employee brought a First Amendment action).
[FN142]. Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson & Guillermo A. Montero, “Oh Lord, Please
Don't Let Me Be Misunderstood!”: Rediscovering the Matthews v. Eldridge and Penn
Central Frameworks, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 46 (2005) (arguing that Lingle forecloses
“consideration of the extent to which a challenged regulation actually serves the
government interests sought to be advanced”).

[FN143]. Id. (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542). Unlike Pearson, Lawson and his
colleagues seek to redefine the “character” factor rather than eliminate it. See infra Part
IV.B.1 (describing and critiquing their proposed test). This Part addresses Lawson and
his colleagues' critique of the balancing test because their argument is similar to
Pearson's.
[FN144]. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542 (citation omitted).
[FN145]. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
[FN146]. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). The Court noted that the issue “may be relevant in discerning
whether a taking has occurred.” Id.
[FN147]. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring); supra notes 7071 and accompanying text.
[FN148]. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 530.
[FN149]. See infra Part III.B.1.
[FN150]. See infra Part III.B.2.
[FN151]. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 8, §10.6, at 430 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S.
at 539).
[FN152]. RAR Dev. Assocs. v. N.J. Sch. Constr. Corp., No. L-9424-05, 2008 WL
2663403, at *11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 9, 2008) (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539).
[FN153]. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) (emphasis added).
[FN154]. Id.
[FN155]. Id.
[FN156]. Id. at 542.
[FN157]. Christopher T. Goodin, The Role and Content of the Character of the
Governmental Action Factor in a Partial Regulatory Takings Analysis, 29 U. Haw. L.
Rev. 437, 444 (2007); see also cases cited supra note 105.
[FN158]. Goodin, supra note 157, at 444 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543).
[FN159]. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123.

[FN160]. Id. at 124.
[FN161]. Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1, 20-28 (2008) (articulating theoretical justifications for considering this factor).
[FN162]. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633-34 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (internal citations omitted).
[FN163]. Id. at 633 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123-24).
[FN164]. Id. at 634 (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992)).
[FN165]. Alternatively, courts could interpret the “character” factor to require
consideration of both the public interest underlying the regulation and the extent to which
plaintiffs are disproportionately burdened by regulation. But given the vagueness of both
concepts, requiring courts to regularly balance the two factors may be more confusing
than the balancing test addressed in the text. See infra Part IV.B.2 (explaining why the
“unfair burden” concept is so confusing that it should generally not be the primary focus
of judicial inquiry).
[FN166]. In fact, zoning often increases, rather than decreases, property values. See
Timlin Kate Sanders, Making Landowners Whole Without Putting Holes in Zoning:
Personal Waivers as the Solution to the Partial Regulatory Takings Compensation Issue,
15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 513, 541 (2008) (“[T]he cost of housing has risen dramatically
higher than the actual construction cost of homes in the past thirty years, and research
shows a correlation between zoning and inflated housing prices.”).
[FN167]. Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 639 (Minn. 2007).
[FN168]. See supra notes 8, 76-87 and accompanying text.
[FN169]. See Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 8, §10.6, at 429 (Penn Central's
“indeterminate factors provide little guidance to individuals”); id. §10.7, at 431 (“The
Court has not defined ‘investment-backed expectations.”’); id. at 433 (“‘[T]here is no
readily identifiable pattern to state court investment-backed expectations decisions.”’
(quoting J. David Breemer, Playing the Expectations Game: When Are InvestmentBacked Land Use Expectations (Un)Reasonable in State Courts?, 38 Urb. Law. 81, 110
(2006))).
[FN170]. See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 378 (2008)
(requiring courts to consider “the balance of equities and the public interest,” among
other factors, when deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction); Nat'l Archives &
Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004) (requiring courts to “balance the
family's privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure” when interpreting a
Freedom of Information Act provision prohibiting the government from disclosing law

enforcement records that would constitute “an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy”); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999) (requiring courts to
“evaluate [a] search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing,
on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests” when historical analysis does not dictate whether a particular government
action violates the Fourth Amendment); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)
(requiring courts to consider a variety of factors, including both the recipient's interest
and “the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement [preferred
by the recipient] would entail” when deciding whether the termination of government
benefits violates due process).
[FN171]. See Goodin, supra note 158, at 446 (contending that any Takings Clause test
that considers the public interest underlying regulation “forces courts to unfairly
discriminate against regulatory takings claimants. This stems from the disparate impact
that results when condemnees (eminent domain) are approached differently than inverse
condemnees (regulatory takings)”). John Echeverria rejects relying directly on the
purpose of government regulation because
[i]t would make no sense in a condemnation case, for example, to suggest that the
government should be excused from its obligation to pay for a school site because the
school will serve a vital educational need. Likewise, ... it makes no sense to suggest that
the government's liability to pay compensation on account of its regulatory actions should
vary with the importance of the public purpose served by the regulation.
John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y
171, 206 (2005).
[FN172]. This would be the case if the Court held that all losses above a certain
percentage (e.g., ninety percent of resale value) were compensable. The Court, however,
appears to have rejected this view in Palazzolo. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 616 (requiring application of the Penn Central balancing test, even though the
plaintiff lost ninety-three percent of his property's resale value due to regulation; his
parcel would be worth over $3.1 million if fully developed, but retained only $200,000 in
development value as a result of regulation).
[FN173]. Indeed, some theorists argue that any reduction in property value is a
compensable “taking.” See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Next Generation of Legal
Scholarship?, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 635, 640 (1978) (reviewing Bruce A. Ackerman, Private
Property and the Constitution (1977)) (“Any diminution of rights in the bundle of any
holder ... amounts to a taking under the law.”). But for the purposes of this Article, I
assume that the Supreme Court will continue to follow its current precedent rather than
adopt such theories. Whether such precedent correctly interprets the Takings Clause is
beyond the scope of this Article.
[FN174]. See supra Parts II.B, II.C.

[FN175]. See infra Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2. In addition, Whitman proposes that courts
consider public purpose by considering the “necessity” of a regulation as a defense to a
taking claim. See Whitman, supra note 132, at 589-90. Whitman reasons that existing
precedent allows “background principles of nuisance and property law [to provide] a
defense to a takings claim,” id. at 582, and that public necessity is such a “background
principle.” Id. at 589-90. This test, however, as Professor Whitman explains, presupposes
that the Lingle Court meant to eliminate the “character of the government action”
element of Penn Central--a conclusion that I reject. See id. at 581-82.
[FN176]. Lawson, Ferguson & Montero, supra note 142, at 46.
[FN177]. Id.; see also D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential LongTerm Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due
Process, 69 Alb. L. Rev. 343, 354 n.55 (2005) (endorsing this test).
[FN178]. If the government permanently occupies property, its action is automatically a
compensable taking and Penn Central is irrelevant. See Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV, Inc., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
[FN179]. This not only includes the direct decrease in the plaintiff's property value, but
also the effect, if any, on her reasonable investment-backed expectations.
[FN180]. Another option is multiple thresholds: one in cases where the landowner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations have been adversely affected by government
regulation, and a higher threshold where the landowner's expectations, if any, were
unreasonable.
[FN181]. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001); see also Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (diminution in value at 87.5 percent but not
compensable).
[FN182]. Professor Lawson and his colleagues suggest that “routine land use regulations
... almost certainly would not effect a taking.” Lawson, Ferguson & Montero, supra note
142, at 46.
[FN183]. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reaffirming commitment
to ad hoc balancing); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
[FN184]. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (quoting Penn Cent.,
438 U.S. at 124).
[FN185]. See Alan Romero, Ends and Means In Takings Law After Lingle v. Chevron,
23 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 333, 363 (2008) (discussing relevant precedent in more
detail).
[FN186]. Goodin, supra note 158, at 447.

[FN187]. Id. at 449.
[FN188]. Id. at 450.
[FN189]. Id. at 452-53.
[FN190]. Id. at 454.
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